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The Justification of Authority 
and the Insulation of Formal Reasons 
Claudio Michelon" 
The practical agent, faced with a choice between performing and refraining from 
performing an action, has to decide not only what to do, but also how to fight her way 
through the pluralism she carries within. Elsewhere I claimed that there are moral reasons 
that apply to an agent's process of decision-making. Those reasons aim at solving the problems 
with which the agent is faced in trying to lead her life consistently. An agent trying to do the 
right thing would ask whether or not there is an obligation to always decide on reasons or 
whether or not public and private agents are morally required to use different strategies of 
decision-making. One of the most important questions one might ask about the morality 
of decision-making is how should reasons interact within a particular process of reasoning. 
Broadly speaking there seem to be at least two ways in whkh we can conceive that interaction: 
a) reasons might be weighed against one another and b) reasons might exclude other sorts 
of reasons from the very process of deliberation. 
In the first situation (that is, the weighing of reasons against one another), we might 
say, to use J. Raz's terminology, that the defeated reason is excluded by weight, while in the 
second we might say, again following Raz, that the defeated reason was excluded by kind. 
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The problem I am direcdy concerned with in this article is whether or not legitimate 
authoritative rules can exclude moral reasons from the public agent's decision-making process. 
In other words, I shall be discussing the thesis that rules emanating from legitimate authorities 
are formal reasons. It has been said that one is not treating rules (or any other sort of 
authoritative decision, such as rurect orders) as formal (authoritative) if one weighs the value 
of obeying the rule against the value of disobeying it1• If an agent's practical decision-
making process involves considerations which could lead to disobeying a rule, this agent 
would not by definition be treating this rule as authoritative. That implies that authoritative 
rules, if their authority is jusdfied Oegitimate), would have priority over other considerations 
in processes of practical decision~making. In this article I am specifically interested in one 
particular justification for that thesis, namely, the justification originally sketched by Joseph 
Raz in Practical Reasons and Norms, and later fully developed in The Morality of Freedom 
2
. This papers is part of a project of rethinking formal reasons which is, in turn, part of a 
larger project of proposing an ethical theory that is applicable to decision~making processes 
and which is not fully dependent on the ethical theory that is applicable to actions. 
My argument aims at making the point that arguments such as the one put forward 
by Raz by means of his 'normal justification' and 'pre~ernption' theses cannot prove that 
reasons emanating from legitimate authoritative sources are able to exclude other reasons by 
kind from practical decision-making'. But before dealing directly with Raz's argument, I will 
say something about the sort of reasons politically created reasons can be. I shall identify 
then precisely which sort of politically created Raz's argument supposes authoritative reasons 
are. That approach will help to establish the different senses in which authoritative orders 
might be said to interfere in a subject's autonomy and, in particular, the different ways in which 
they can intervene in the subject's decision-making. I shall use this examination of the ways in 
whjch authority might intervene in the subject's decision-making to introduce a distinction 
between reasons that make an action right and wrong (which I shalt simply call 'reasons for 
1 As Atiyah has pointed out, Raz's conception of rules as exclusionary reasons hints precisely at that ide~ 
of formality. Rules properly understood are not rules of thumb to be checked against the actual 
subst~ntive reasons; they exclude those reasons altogether from consideration. See P. S. 
Atiyah, Form ~nd substance in contract la\\j in The Legal Mind, ed. :;I, MacCormick and P. Birks, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1986, 20-1; see also J Raz Practical Reasons and Norms (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2nd edition,1990), passim. 
·'- J Ra7. The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986). 
-
1 Because legal rules are the par~digmatic instance of authoritative rules, I shall often be referring to 
them in what follows, but that does not mean that my arguments do not apply to other sorts of 
authoritative directives. 
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action') and reasons one should use in order to decide particular cases (which 1 shall call 'reasons 
to decide').! believe that 1hz's normal justification thesis applies not to the former, but to the 
latter sort of reason and the second section of this article is an attempt to establish whether or 
not Raz's argument is sufficient to justify an insulation between legal and moral reasons/or 
deciding. The third sections will be an attempt to outline an alternative account of formal 
reasons in which they are not insulated from substantive consideration but, rather, interact 
with those sorts of considerations in a particular way. 
Authority and Autonomous Decision-Making 
Let me start by mapping up the field of authoritative intervention on decision-
making processes in order to clarify what sorts of intervention I am claiming cannot be 
justified. First, political authority might intervene on its subjects decision-making process 
simply by preventing their decision-making altogether. If political authority does have enough 
raw power to prevent me from having a choice on a particular matter, it takes from me the 
very possibility of deciding to do certain things. The agent's practical reasoning is eliminated 
and substituted by the authority's reasoning. A policeman who locks someone up is not 
creating a reason for the person not to go to a dinner party in, it is making the decision of 
whether or not to go to the dinner pointless. I have no doubt that it is possible to find a 
justification for this sort of intervention in certain very qualified contexts, but that is not the 
sort of intervention I am dealing with in this paper. 
Secondly, and quite apart from directly exerting force against its members, the 
community might intervene in the very process of deliberation through which the person 
decides what is the best course of action. One way in which this intervention might come 
about is simply by means of threats of using force. \X!hen the authority issues a statement 
in which it declares that all those who perform a certain action (say, assault) will be imprisoned 
for a certain time, it is not exerting force directly, but simply attempting to intervene in the 
decision-making process of tl1e subject by means of creating a reason to perform an action. 
That is not what Raz means by authoritative intervention, since anyone who is in a position 
of threatening someone else would have that sort of 'authority'. 
Indeed, the authoritative intervention in an agent's process of decision-making 
takes more subtle forms. An example might help to explain those more subtle forms of 
authoritative intervention. Suppose that, after some thinking, I arrive at the conclusion that 
you should do something, for instance, that you should read my last book, and then I tell 
you of my conclusion. How can my saying that you should read my book change your 
previous situation regarding the range of options open to you as to whether or not to read 
my book? It could be that you take my decision to express a fact that you believe to be 
relevant for the decision you are about to make. In this situation, the communication of my 
conclusion about how you should behave would only have a bearing on your possibilities 
of decision if it gives some information about the world that is in itself a relevant piece of 
information. If we assume that you care about my well-being, informing you that 1 would 
be sad were you not to read my book would give you a good reason to read it. The decision 
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could then be interpreted not as a command, but as a description of a given state of affairs4• 
It gives you a reason to believe that a given fact is the case, but not necessarily a reason to 
believe that the fact is a reason for action. The best way to show that that intervention should 
not be conceived as 'authoritative' is to ask whether or not this sort of intervention in a 
decision-making process is detrimental to the decision maker's autonomy? 
It would seem that it isn't, for after my intervention (stating that you should read 
my book) you are still a fully autonomous decision-maker if only a bit better informed 
about the facts and possible factual consequences of your decision. I can still manipulate you 
by providing selective information or by telling lies that I think will bring you to decide in 
one way rather than another. Nevertheless there is no reason why my opinion should be 
taken into consideration in its own right. This is clear in two different situations: first, had 
you learned about the facts that you infer from my telling you that you should read my book 
before I told you to do so, your possibilities of decision wouldn't be changed by my 
supervening intervention; secondly, had you learned about those facts through completely 
different means (someone told you that I would be upset if you decided not to read my 
book), the outcome would be the same. Of course, there is a sense in which providing 
information changes the moral landscape of an individual. If, for instance, I know that my 
performing action x (buying a car) will have consequence y (someone will die), I cannot usc 
my lack of knowledge as a moral excuse for my having performed x. Information might 
exclude one possible excuse from my moral estate. 
However, there is a different way of interfering in someone's affairs which has a 
different sort of bearing on his practical reasoning and which is of particular interest for the 
understanding of pojjtical and specifically legal authority. Under some conditions, my 
statement that you should read my book may be relevant in itself, which means that the fact 
that I reached a given conclusion and that I told you about it may itse/fbe a reason for you 
to decide to act according to my conclusion. That means that nothing changes in the world 
as a result of my statement, nothing about pre-existing facts is learned from my statement, 
the only difference between your situation before my statement and after my statement is the 
fact that I said that you should do something. I believe that to be perfectly conceivable, given 
certain circumstances, but I shall return to that latter. 
Because that is a change in the criteria for the correctness of decision-making, nothing 
in principle guarantees that the reason created will or should prevail agajnst all other reasons 
available to the subject in her actual decision-making process. \X!hether or not my conclusion 
4 In spite of the apparent similarity, this sort of intervention in the deliberative process is not the same 
sort of intervention that might be produced by the authority Raz called 
'recognitional'. ln Raz's depiction of the recognitional conception of authority "[tlhe authoritative 
utteranCes of practical authority are reasons to believe that one ought to do that which the utterance says 
one is to do". (1. Raz, The Morality of Freedom, cit., 30). The interference in practical reasoning sketched 
above doesn't provide you with any reason to bel.icve that a given course of action is the correct one, but 
only with a reason to believe that a given situation obtains (a situation that you happen to find relevant 
to your decision). 
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that you should read this book is a relevant factor in your actual process of deliberation 
depends on you attributing some value to it (say, the value of pleasing a friend). The 
decision itself is not self-enforcing in this sense and you ate still autonomous in the important 
sense that you are not obliged to take my conclusion into consideration. That sort of 
interference (obliging someone to give weight to one's statement about what should be 
done in her process of deliberation) could be achieved through many different methods of 
conditioning deliberative behavior by force or by argument, but, as Hart once pointed out 
'being obUged' is different from 'having an obligation'. 
In order to understand the sort of interference in decision-making processes I will be 
referring to as 'authoritative', it is important to bear in mind that rational decision-making 
processes always aim at correctly weighing up the reasons. If this is so, there is a sense in 
which your selection of reasons is not arbitrary. In the Clouds, Aristophanes mocks Socrates 
(and through Socrates the whole of practical philosophy) for he leaves the stage when the 
exchanges betw'een Justice and Injustice are about to start5 • According to Leo Strauss, this 
makes it appear as if Socrates wanted to have no influence on the exchanges so that he would 
not be responsible for the outcomes6• If one wanted to be fair to Socrates (which is probably 
not Aristophanes' wish), one could take his act of leaving the stage as meaning simply that 
what makes an action just or unjust or a process of deliberation correct or incorrect is not 
dependent on the opinion held by the decision-maker about what should count as a just 
action or a correct deliberation. The meaning of Socrates' lack of interest in the exchange 
bet\Veen justice and injustice might be seen as an allegory of the fact that, whatever the 
correct balance of reasons is, it is not dependent on the subject's opinion on what the right 
balance of reasons should be. Moreover, the reasons that come into play when a moral agent 
is weighing reasons against one another in order to decide what to do are not freely chosen by 
the agent. Socrates' presence is, then, of no consequence. In short: one might have some 
control over the reasons one actually take into account in deciding what to do, but one has 
little or, sometimes, no control whatsoever, over the reasons that must be taken into account 
in order to decide what to do. 
Now suppose that, under some circumstances, someone's actions have the power to 
alter someone else's moral situation by including further reasons among the reasons which 
morally should be taken into consideration and weighed by the decision-maker. If those 
circumstances obtain, someone's action will cause the inclusion of one reason in the list of 
relevant reasons that should be taken into account by someone else. \X!hat was changed as a 
> The Clouds, 886-7 
6 This is Strauss's interpretation of Socrates's exiting from the stage at precisely that moment. Leo 
Strauss Socrates and Aristophanes (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), 28-9. 
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result of the first agent's action was the criterion for correctness of the second agent's 
decision-making process and this has a particular sort of impact on the latter's autonomy. 
Through this sort of intervention, one is not only modifying actual decision-making processes 
by including or excluding reasons, but modifying the standard for what would be the right 
decision-making process in the particular circumstances. An authoritative intervention in 
someone's autonomy is an intervention of precisely that kind. 
Reasons for decision and Reasons for Action 
Before I move on to deal directly with Raz's argument for the justification of that 
sort of intervention on an agent's decision-making, I would like to deal with an ambiguity 
in the phrase 'reasons for action'. If that ambiguity is not fully spelled out, I believe the 
conception of authority I just put forward in the last section might be misunderstood. On 
the one hand, 'reason for action' can be understood as a fact or set of facts whose occurrence 
in the world makes it correct to perform a given action 7 • An example might help me to 
conduct the discussion here. In the limited context of deciding how to invest your money 
and, given that the only relevant considerations are those related to the increase of capital 
ovc-'1' time, the fact that the government is soon to intervene in the market so as to devalue 
the national currency is a good reason for deciding to invest in foreign currency. If this is what 
is meant by saying that there is a 'reason for action', tl1e only way I can intervene in the criteria 
according to which your decision-making is judged is by changing something in the world. 
In our example, if the government changes its mind and decides not to devalue the currency 
the reason for investing in foreign currency that you had before disappears and such investment, 
other things being equal, would be not as good an investment. 
On the other hand, 'reason for action' might refer to a reason one takes, or 
should take, into account in a deliberative process. Let me call those reasons 'reasons 
for deciding to perform a given action' (or more briefly 'reasons for deciding') so as to 
reserve 'reasons for action' to the changes in the world mentioned in the last paragraph. 
The difference I am trying to draw attention to is often misunderstood as a result of 
taking it as a difference between reasons which exist objectively speaking and the 
possession of those reasons by the subject. If this were correct, it would seem to follow 
that all the reasons one should take into account in decision-making processes would be 
the objective reasons for actions that exist in the world. The difference between reasons 
for action and reasons for deciding would simply be that the latter, but not the former, 
are used by a particular subject. That means that if the decision-making process is to be 
considered correct, all reasons for deciding would be objective reasons for action which 
already existed in the world before being 'embodied' into the particular decision-making 
7 See J. Raz, Practical Reasons and Norms, cit., 16ff; see also M. J. Detmold The Unity of Law and Morality 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984), pp 8ff. 
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process. I believe this conception of reasons for deciding to be insufficient. In decision~ 
making processes carried out under imperfect conditions, notably conditions oflimitcd 
knowledge or limited time to decide, there are often reasons for deciding in a particular 
way rather than another which are not objective reasons for the action in the sense 
referred to above. In order to show this, let us go back to a variation of the example 
introduced above. 
Suppose 1 have to decide how to invest my money but I haven't the faintest idea 
of what would be the best way to get a good profit/time ratio for my money. I then take 
the wise step of consulting an expert who is, I have reasons to believe, the best advisor I 
could get, and he tells me to invest all my money in foreign currency. I now have reasons 
to invest in foreign currency and, other things remaining the same, deciding to invest in 
something else would be a mistake. One might say that I don't have a reason to decide to 
do something, but only a reason to believe that some facts arc the case, and that those 
facts are actually the case is a reason for me to decide to invest in foreign currency. That is 
true, but it is hardly an objection to the point I am trying to make. In order to make it clear 
why, let us suppose now that the expert is wrong because the government never thought 
of devaluing the national currency or because other factors the expert never considered 
relevant come into play so that the price of foreign currency doesn't actually rise much even 
after the government's intervention. As an investment, my buying foreign currency was 
disastrous, but there is a sense in which my decision was not a mistake. Otherwise, one 
would have to admit that the right decision in the case would have been to trust someone 
who knows nothing about investment (me) instead of the person I recognise as someone 
who knows a lot about it. If I am right, a rationally correct decision (which takes into 
account the correct reasons for deciding) does not necessarily lead to a correct action. 
Consequently, reasons to decide in a correct decision~making process arc not necessarily the 
reasons for action which are in the world. To sum up: it is possible that I make the right 
decision to do the wrong thing. 
Let us now leave financing aside and move back into the ethics of pub tic decision-
making which is, after all, the main concern of this paper. The first thing that has to be 
settled is the relevance of all that to ethics. The relevance is simply that having taken the 
right decision often works as a moral excuse for those who perform wrong actions. If l 
did everything 1 could do, given my limitations which I cannot eliminate before performing 
the action, and if I correctly balanced my reasons to decide under those conditions of 
limitation, I have a claim to be excused, although it may sometimes not be cnough 8• 
Reasons for action and reasons for deciding are both practical in the sense that one can 
judge through those reasons either the correctness of dlC action or the correctness of the decision 
0 I am grateful to Fernando A1ria for this insight. 
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to act. Although political power can create reasons for action, for instance, by deciding to impose 
sanctions on a gjven action, I believe that the kind of authoritative reasons Raz has in mind are 
reasons for deciding rather than reasons for action. On this reading of Raz, the peculiarity of 
autl1oritative decisions seems to reside in the fact that the action which changes someone's moral 
landscape is just a statement by the public authority about how the agent should act Raz's normal 
justification thesis could then be understood as an attempt to state the general conditions under 
which this sort of interference by the political authority in the subject's autonomy is justified. I 
shall analyse Raz's normal justification thesis in the next section, but let me just make dear that, 
beside Raz's, there are other possible justifications for someone to have the power to intervene in 
someone's autonomy. \Vhen, for instance, a conclusion about how you should behave comes 
from someone that you have reasons to believe to be much wiser than you are, it must be correct 
to trust his judgement In this case, beside the reasons that I take into consideration, I put the 
opinion of the wise man and I am justified in doing so9• 
Those holding political power very often claim to have authority in this sense, that is 
to say they claim that all those towards whom they have authority have a moral obligation to 
take their directives as reasons for deciding to act in the recommended way. Law is one sort 
of institution that claims authority if not always, as Raz, Soper, Green and othersw believe, 
at least often enough. One of the questjons for practical philosophers to answer is under 
which conditions this claim is justified 11 • Not all theories of political obligation have a 
bearing on the problem I am more directly concerned with in this paper, namely, the insulation 
between legal and non~legal reasons 12• Raz's theory of political obligation does. I shall 
devote the second section of the present paper to showing that Raz's theory of political 
authority fails to justify the exclusion non~authoritative reasons for deciding from those 
decision-making processes to which authoritative reasons for deciding apply. 
Pre-emption in Legal Reasoning 
The main concern in this paper is, as it was said before, to provide an account of the 
interplay between authoritative legal reasons and non-legal reasons for action in practical 
reasoning and, more specifically, of the sense in whJch authoritative legal reasons can be said 
rightly to exclude other sorts of substantive considerations from particular instances of 
9 This example is :m instance of Ra7:'s 'normal justification thesis', to be examined later in this paper. 
1
'
1 See J Raz, Morality of Freedom, cit., 76,77; a more recent restatement is to bt fmwd in Ra7., Authority, law and 
morality in J. Rnz, Ethics i11 the Public Domain: Essays in the morality of law and politics (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1994), 215ff; Soper accepted that law makes authoritative claims in his Legal theory and the daim of 
authority, in Philosophy and Public Affairs 18, 216ff, but later rejected this thesis in Law's normative claims, in: 
The Autonomy of Law ed. R. P. George Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996, 215-247; see also L. Green The Authority 
of the State (OxfOrd: Oxford University Press, 1988), esp. chapters 8 and 9. 
11 SeeR. Dworkin Law's Empire (London: Fontana Press, 1991; odg edn 1986), 191. 
12 It is, for instance, irre!ennt whether the obligation to obey the law is a natural duty or an acquired 
obligation_ 
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practical reasoning. One of the most important contemporary defenses of the exclusion of 
substantive considerations by legitimate legal reasons for action is to be found in Raz's work 
on legitimate authority and pre-emptive reasons for action. 
Raz's pre-emptive reasons have been subject to intense scrutiny over the past two 
decades13. Instead of restating those objections to Raz's concept of pre-emptive reasons I 
shall be trying to explain in what follows why I believe that Raz's pre-emptive reasons fail to 
do the job he requires from them in terms of his own theory. Let me first advance my thesis: 
in order to be able to exclude first-order moral reasons, second-order reasons (of which 'pre-
emptive' reasons are an instance) first-order reasons must be completely insulated from pre-
emptive reasons, that is to say: regardless of its weight, first order reasons must not be able 
to defeat second order reasons. I believe that the reason Raz offers for considering legal 
reasons as second-order reasons (fundamentaUy, the normal justification thesis) does not 
do the job and the argument in this section aims at proving that the normal justification 
thesis is not able to ground the exclusion of exclusionary reasons from decision-making 
processes14• It would folJow that, in the case of legal reasons at least, the weight of first-
order reasons might make a difference as to whether or not the second-order reason applies 
and, as a result, legal decision-making processes must include an appreciation of the weight 
of first-order reasons. 
Let me start to expose my argument by analyzing Raz's normal justification thesis, 
which expresses the normal condition to be fulfilled by legitimate authority: 
The normal and primary way to establish that a person should be acknowledged to 
have authority over another person invoLves showing that the alleged subject is likely better 
to comply with reasons that apply to him (other than the alleged authoritative directives) if 
13 Just to mention a few, M. J. Detmo!d, The Unity of Law and Mora!it)', cit., 133ff; Soper, "Legal theory 
and the claim of authority", cit.; F. Schauer: Playing by the Rules: A philosophical examination of rule. 
based decision-making in law and in life (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), passim; A. Marmor 
Interpretation and Legal Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 117ff; F. Atria: Legal reasoning 
and legal theory revisited, Law and Philosophy 18 (1999), 566ff. 
1
' That is the problem Detmold named the problem of the exclusion of exclusionary reasons ( 
The Unity of Law and Morality, cit., 134). Detmold himself believes that there are arguments that are 
indeed able to exclude exclusionary reasons (id, 133-36). I shall not dispute the matter here, for I believe 
that, regardless of whether or not there are arguments that are able to justify this double exclusion, the 
argument put forward by Ra7. to insulate legal reasons from f1rst-order reasons is not one of them. 
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he accepts the directives of the alleged authority as authoritatively binding, and tries to 
follow them, than if he tries to follow the reasons which apply to him directly.1s 
To sum it up: authority might create reasons for deciding from scratch whenever it is 
more lzkely to get it right than you are. This condition for the legitimacy of someone's 
authority, says Raz, at the same time reinforces and is reinforced 16 by the imperative expressed 
in the dependence thesis, according to which 
All authoritative directives should be based, among other factors, on reasons which 
apply to the subjects of those directives and which bear on the circumstances covered by the 
directives. 17 
If the condition stated in the normal justification thesis is met, authority is legitimate 
and it is morally correct for the subject to perform the action required by the authority 
without taking into account the reasons that would apply to him if the authoritative directive 
had not been issued. This amounts to a very rough version of the pre-emption thesis, 
whose full statement is: 
The fact that an authority requires performance of an action is a reason for its 
performance which is not to be added to all other relevant reasons when accessing what to 
do, but should replace some of them. 
The pre-emptive thesis was formulated so that it contradicts another account of 
how authoritative directives (including authoritative legal rules) relate to other reasons for 
action. According to this alternative account: 
to accept d1e legitimacy of an authority is simply to accept that whatever other reasons 
there may be for a certain action, its being required by the authority is an additional reason for 
its performance. 18 
I shall argue later that Raz's description of the interplay between authoritative legal 
reasons for action and non-authoritative reasons for action, given the best possible 
understanding of both the pre-emption and the normal justification thesis, does not imply 
a complete insulation of secondary from primary reasons and that, for that reason, there is 
15 J. Raz, Authority, taw and morality, cit., 214. It is interesting to notice how a similar understanding of the 
necessary condition for a rational agent to follow authority was used by Gadamer to ground the 
rationality of following a living tradition. In his Truth and Method (London: Sheed & \X'ard, 2'"1 edition, 
1989), Gadamer defines the rationale behind the prejudice according to which following the tradition 
was in principle correct in terms very similar to Raz's: "But this [blind obedience] is not the essence of 
authority. Admittedly, it is primarily persons that have authority; but the authority of persons is ultimately 
based not on the subjection and abdication of reason but on an act of acknowledgement and knowledge 
- the knowledge, namely, that the other is superior to oneself in judgement and insight and that for this 
reason his judgement takes precedence-" i.e. it has priority over one's own.", 279. 
1c' J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom, cit., 55. 
17 J. Raz, Authority, law and morality, cit., 214. 
1 ~ J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom, cit., 40~41. 
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some truth in the theory according to which authoritative reasons are to be weighed against 
non-authoritative reasons (although, as we shall also see, logically speaking Raz's theory has 
the best of this exchange). But before dealing with Raz's insulation claim, I shall defend the 
normal justification thesis against a number of misguided objections and, in doing so, I 
hope to present it in its strongest version. I also hope that this strong version of the normal 
justification thesis will make it clear why, in the way Raz conceives it, legitimate authority 
creates reasons for deciding rather than reasons for action. 
First, Raz's normal justification thesis could be said to be innocuous for, in any 
practical deliberation, one has to know what the correct action in the particular situation is in 
order to decide if the condition for obedience to authoritative directives stated there (i.e. 
"that one is likely better to comply with reasons that apply to him" if he accepts the 
directives of the alleged authority as binding) is fulfilled. If this were the case, the citizen 
subject to authority would have to go all the way through the deliberation process and find 
out what it is right to do and, if he knows that he would have no reason to follow the 
authoritative directive, since once he knows what is correct, following the authoritative directive 
instead of his own reasons cannot make it more probable that the subject would comply 
with the reasons that apply to him. But this argument would only defeat Raz's conception 
oflegitimate authority under the condition that the only way correctJy to judge the probability 
of doing the right thing in following the putative authority's directives is to know for sure 
what the right answer would be. That is plainly not the case: when one who is completely 
ignorant on financial markets asks a specialist for advice about investment, one knows that 
following the advice would lead more probably to the right investment. Under conclitions 
of unlimited time and resources, it might be correct, if one believes self-determination to be 
valuable, to learn as much as possible about financial markets in order to decide how to 
invest. Under conditions oflimited time and resources, that would be a very foolish way to 
decide how to invest one's money. 
One could then argue that this sort of argument of expertise only works under two 
conditions, one of which cannot be fulfilled in any instance of practical decision-making, 
while the other cannot be fulfilled in the specific case of moral decision-making. The first is 
a continuation of the objection above: it is not possible to know if someone is better 
prepared to take decisions if one cannot compare the decisions that should be taken and the 
advice given. This is again plainly not true, since I can easily recognise that someone is more 
competent in some areas of decision-making than I am, for instance, from my knowledge 
of his background or from the fact that in the past he often pointed out mistakes in my 
practical reasoning which I later came to recognise as mistakes19• The other objection is that 
this sort of justification can only justify technical-practical decisions because the ends are set 
by the person subject to the authority, and the advice is only about how better to achieve 
1 ~ C. :\kMahon Autonomy and authority, Philosophy and Public 1\ffairs 16 (1987). 309. 
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those ends. Without the subject having a notion of what is a correct action beforehand there 
is no way in which she can judge whether or not she is more likely to perform the correct 
action if she follows the advice. So, if I am asking for advise in my investments, I can only 
regard expert advice as authoritative if I know what a good investment is Qet's say, one that 
gives more return in a shorter time). That is indeed true: one has to have an idea of what 
counts as morally good which is independent of what the authority says in order to judge if 
one is more likely to perform the morally correct action when following the authoritative 
directives. But this is hardly a decisive objection to Raz's theory of legitimate authority, for 
knowing what is correct in general doesn't imply knowing what is correct in a particular 
instance. I may believe that promoting equality is the correct thing to do when one is 
deciding what to do with one's money and still not know if I should give my extra money 
to the government or to share it amongst all the beggars I know, for I might not know what 
is the best way to achieve equality. Now suppose that someone whom I regard as having 
more technical knowledge about whether giving the money to the beggars or giving the 
money to the government will improve equality tells me that giving the money to the 
beggars is the best course of action, given my aim of furthering equality. In this situation, 
would it be correct for me to give it to the government? Plainly not. This intervention has 
the potential power of changing my moral landscape. Even if the person I regard as being 
a specialist is wrong in this particular case and giving money to the government would 
eventually prove to be more effective in bringing equality about than sharing it out to the 
beggars, the intervention of this much more knowledgeable person who understands 
much better than I do the inner mechanisms of the government and the behavior of 
beggars to whom money is given makes it morally defensible to follow his advice. Acting 
against his advice may bring about more equality (if the expert turns out to be wrong), but 
my decision of not following his advice cannot be justified, since it is wrong to perform an 
action that one has reasons to think is morally worse than an alternative. 
Soper adopted another line of criticism in arguing that Raz's understanding of the 
authority of law as being grounded in the condition expressed in the normal justification 
thesis "virtuaJly eliminates the traditional distinction between theoretical and practical 
authority" 20• Soper then goes on to claim that the practical authority of law implies what 
he calls double pre~emption and, based on that, he establishes the difference between 
theoretical authority about practical matters and practical authority: practical authority 
claims complete content~independence (which entails pre-emption) whereas theoretical 
c.o P. Soper, Legal theory and the claim of authority, cit., 224. 
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authority claims only pre-emption. 21 
I have no reason to dispute Soper's claim that there is a distinction between theoretical 
and practical authority. However, his objection to Raz relies on an assumption that there can be 
no logical relation of implication between the two sorts of reasons that are the currency of, 
respectively, theoretical authority and practical authority: reasons to believe and reasons to act. I 
would like to object to precisely that asswnption. Suppose theoretical authority is what Soper 
claims it is and suppose also that the law (or rather, the law-giver) is taken to have this sort of 
authority based on expertise in a particular case in which it issues the directive that action xis 
right. This would be enough reason for a subject that regards the law-giver as theoretically 
authoritative to have a reason to believe that action xis right. In turn, believing that action xis 
the right action to perform is a reason to deciding to do x. The apparendy sharp separation 
between reasons to believe and reasons to act collapses when one has a reason to believe that an 
action should be pcrformed22. Such a reason is itself a reason to act and this is a fact of the 
grammar of beliefs. To say 'A_ll applicable reasons support the belief that xis the right to do, 
but I don't have any reason to do x' makes as much sense as saying that 'All applicable reasons 
support the belief that the cat is on the mat, but there is no reason to believe that the cat is on 
the mat'. Ifl am right that a reason to believe that an action is right is a reason to perform that 
action, it follows that this sort of'theoretical' authority which gives you those sorts of reasons 
to believe become ipso facto relevant for the decision-maker's practical reasoning. In short: 
although a conceptual distinction could be made between theoretical and practical authority, 
under some conditions, having one implies having the other. If the normal justification thesis 
succeeds in justifying theoretical authority in a given case, that is, if the putative authority is 
effectively more likely to get it right, I have good reasons to decide to follow its directives, even 
if they turn out to be wrong. 
I hope that from the preceding cLscussion a picture has emerged of the conditions under 
which d1e normal justification thesis can justify the use of authoritative directives as guides for 
decision~making, even in situations in which the reasons for action point in another direction. In 
that picture, reasons for deciding in a particular way might be introduced by the normal justification 
thesis, even if the normal justification thesis does not generate reasons for action. 
But l{az's claim is not only that the fulfillment of the condition stated in the normal 
justification thesis makes the authoritative directive a reason for deciding in a particular way. 
According to him, the fulfillment of the conditions specified in the normal justification 
thesis makes the authoritative directive into a reason of a specific kind which relates (or 
shmlld relate) peculiarly to other kinds of reasons. This kind of reason Raz calls 'exclusionary' 
or 'pre~emptive'. Pre-emptive reasons, as any other 'winning' reason render other reasons 
for action not applicable to the instant case, but they do so in a particular way. They do not 
21 idem, 225. 
22 A similar view was put forward by Postema in his distinctions between direct and indirect guidance of 
actions by reasons, see G. Postema Jurisprudence as practical philosophy, Legal Theory 4 (1998), 346. 
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exclude reasons for action by outweighing them, but by the application of"a general principle 
of practical reasoning which determines that exclusionary reasons always prevail when in 
conilictwith first-order reasons"23, Pre-emptive reasons are examples of second-·order reasons, 
which means that they are reasons to act or refrain from acting for a primary reason24• They 
can exclude first-order (or primary) reasons by kind. First-order reason&, in Raz's terminology, 
are reasons either to perform or not to perfom1 a particular action. Second-order reasons can 
be rendered inapplicable to one case by another second-order reason, but can never be 
challenged by a first-order reason. Challenging a pre-emptive reason with a first~order reason 
implies either completely denying its pre-emptive nature or denying that its scope covers a 
particular set of primary reasons. This challenge, says Raz, can only be performed by second-
order reasons. All reasons which concern the pre-emptive nature of a particular reason and 
the scope of this pre-emption are second-order reasons (to refer to the latter, Raz uses the 
expression 'scope-affecting reasons'2~. It is dear that, for a reason to be pre-emptive of other 
reasons in a particular instance of practical reason, it is necessary that some issues concerning 
its pre-emptiveness and the scope of its pre-emption have to be settled. 
Practical reasoning, understood here as reasoning which aims at informing action, can 
be perfonned at the second~order level. Theoretical reasoning which uses primary reasons is not 
pre-empted by pre-emptive reasons, since "it is merely the action for some of those reasons 
which is excluded"26 • One could still hold an opinion on whether or not the performance of 
the particular action required by the authority is right. \Xfhat one cannot do, according to Raz, is 
to act on those reasons. Deliberating, concluding that the authority is wrong and even criticizing 
the authority are actions that are not excluded by pre-emptive reasons. But the relevant question 
for a practically rational agent is whether or not Raz's justification for the existence of authoritative 
reasons succeeds in justifying that primary reasons be insulated from secondary reasons in 
actual contexts of decision-making. Two objections against Raz's thesis look promising, the 
first questions the credentials of the nonnal justification thesis, while the second assumes the 
normal justification thesis is true, but objects that it cannot justify the insulation between first-
order and second~ordcr reasons. Let us examine them separately. 
The first objection runs as follows: if the normal justification thesis is a moral reason 
nothing grants in principle that there could be no other moral reason applicable to the 
situation that could defeat the very normal justification thesis. In order to prove that, Raz 
would need, so tbe objection goes, a further argument to justify the systematic priority of 
the normal justification thesis to all od1er moral reasons27 • In the absence of such an argument, 
the subject should test the normal justification thesis against all available moraJ reasons and, 
since the normal justifictltion thesis is a third order reason that explain which sorts of second 
n]. Raz, Practical Reasons and Norms, cit., 40. 
14 idem 39 
15 idem' 46 
1
·
0 J. Ra;., The Morality of Freedom, cit., 42. 
z7 \'Vbat I consider to be a decisive objection against the existence of systematic priority (or, as Rawls names 
it, mdcxica! order) between moral reasons see Ch. Taylor, Leading a life in Incomensurability, Incomparabihty 
and Practical Reason cd. R. Chang Cambridge, 1\.YA: Harvard University Press, 1997, 170-183. 
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order reasons are admissible, no insulation between first-order and second-order reason 
would be granted. All first order reasons would be, in principle, capable to defeat the reason 
why they should be insulated, namely, the normal justification thesis. I believe that objection 
to be wrong, since there is a good reason to believe that moral values cannot defeat the 
normal justification thesis. Moral values cannot defeat it simply because the normal justification 
states the correctness of doing what is most likely to be the correct thing to do.If we spell out 
some of the non-stated conditions for its plausibility (fallibility of human judgement, the 
existence of different levels of moral insight), the normal justification thesis is not so much 
a moral directive as it is a self-evident statement about a particular structural feature of 
morality. That one always aims at doing what one considers to be the right thing is triviaF8 . 
But the fact that the normal justification thesis cannot be defeated by substantive 
moral values does not imply that it can justify pre-emption of reasons. As it often happens 
with arguments that follow from tautologies, the source of its irrefutability is also the source 
of its impotence. Let me start to show that by introducing an example. Suppose that the 
legal authority issues the following directive: "Smoking anywhere in the new building of the 
Scottish Parliament is forbidden". Let's assume that I have a reason to believe that my 
abiding by the authoritative directive makes me more likely to comply with reasons that 
apply to me than if I try to follow the reasons which apply to me directly. At this point, 
someone raises the question of whether the authoritative directive is right or wrong and I 
start wondering whether the thing required by the authority is the best thing to do after all 
(remember that I am not forbidden to think about those things, only to think of them as 
reasons for my action). If the reasons I produce against the action being performed are not 
good, nothing changes; but suppose I arrive at the conclusion that the action required by the 
authority is conclusively wrong (remember that I can hold such an opinion). Can I hold this 
opinion and at the same time hold the opinion that I am more likely to comply with 
reasons that apply to me by following the directive than if I try to follow the reasons which 
apply to me directly? The fact that I know for sure that the authoritative directive is wrong 
implies that I cannot consistently claim that the normal justjfkation thesis justifies my 
following the authoritative rule. 
\Vhat I am trying to get at here is that there is no reason why a jolly good first-order 
reason against the authoritative rule wouldn't imply the existence of the following second-
order reason: "it is not probable that I wilJ do what is right by following the authoritative 
order". That sort of reasons must be taken into consideration not because the agent 
2g I refer here to the classical theme of the untenable position of an agent that aims at being acratic. 
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believes is to be true, but because the normal justification thesis so demands, since an 
opinion about the probability of an action being correct cannot be held together with an 
opiillon decisively against its correctness. Probability is the currency of the normal justification 
thesis and judgements of probability are sensitive to judgements of certainty: Second~order 
reasons are not precluded from the second level of reasoning and, therefore, they would 
have to be taken into consideration. It follows that, if primary reasons are to have no 
influence in the practical deliberation on matters covered by authoritative rules, a reason 
would have to be provided to explain why those sorts of second-order reason would be also 
precluded from decision~making. 
Raz does not explicitly provide arguments to explain this further preclusion, but he 
hints at some possible ways in which it could be justified. The first of those hints is to be 
found in his objection to the thesis that authoritative reasons are prima facie reasons for 
action which should be weighed against all other reasons for action. Notwithstanding its 
specific aim, the argument (if it works) hits the much bigger target of justifying complete 
insulation of secondary reasons from primary reasons. 
The argument is a justification for surrendering one's judgement to the authority 
altogether. This surrender will be justified if this will decrease my rate of mistakes in a 
particular area. The first step Raz invites us to take is to 
lc]onsider the case in a general way. Suppose I can identify a range of cases in which 
I am wrong more than the putative authority. Suppose I decide because of this to tilt the 
balance in those cases in favour of this solution. That is, in every case I will ftrst make up my 
own mind independently of the 'authority's' verdict, and then, in those cases in which my 
judgement differs from its, I will add a certain weight to the solution favoured by it, on the 
ground that it, the authority, knows better than I. This procedure -will reverse my independent 
judgement in a certain proportion of the cases. Sometimes even after giving the argument 
favoured by the authority an extra weight it will not win. On other occasions the additional 
weight will make aU the difference. How will I fare under this procedure? If, as we are 
assuming, there is no other relevant information then we can expect that in the cases in which 
1 endorse the authority's judgement my rate of mistakes decljnes and equals that of the 
authority. In the cases in which even now I contradict the authority's judgement the rate of 
my mistakes remains unchanged i.e. greater than that of the authority.29 
At first sight, Raz's conclusion doesn't seem to follow from the premises of his 
argument. It would seem that the most effective way to enhance my moral performance is to 
disobey the authority in all those cases in which the authority is wrong and accept its authority 
in all those cases in which the authority is right. Following tl1at strategy, my overall performance 
will be better than it would be had I strictly followed either my own independent judgement 
2~]. Raz, The Morality of Freedom, cit., 68. 
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or the authority's directives. But how could this further scenario happen? There is a need for 
a criterion to decide when it is right to follow the authoritative directive and when it is wrong 
to do so. Whichever criterion one puts forward, it will question the assumption that the 
authority knows better in the field and, if this assumption is defeated, the directives are not 
regarded as authoritative, for the grounds for authority established by the normal justification 
thesis would be challenged. One is just specifying an area in which authority is not recognised. 
As Raz puts it: 
Of course sometimes I do have additional information showing that the authority 
is better than me in some areas and not in others. This may be sufficient to show that it lacks 
authority over me in those other areas. The argument about the pre-emptiveness of 
authoritative decrees does not apply to such cases. 30 
My claim is that this additional information may simply be the fact that the agent is 
sure that one particular course of action required by the authority is wrong according to the 
primary reasons relevant to the particular case. Of course sometimes the agent would believe 
the authority is wrong, but, not being very sure about it and recognizing the authority's 
higher competence in the area, she may be inclined to surrender her judgement. But this 
doesn't need always to be the case. There is no reason to reject the thesis according to which, 
in every particular case of practical reasoning in which putative authoritative claims authority, 
the claim of authority is itself open to challenge from primary reasons. 
I believe Raz would not be happy to allow this sort of leakage from first-order into 
second-order reasoning, since part of the point of having rules is to provide "an intermediate 
level of reasons"31 between deeper level considerations and concrete decisions. Indeed, if 
this leaking really happens, the pre-emption of primary reasons may be describing the logical 
order of a correct course of reasoning, but, for the particular agent, legal and non-legal 
reasons will interact in much the same way as other reasons interact, to wit: strong non-legal 
reasons for action will be able to debunk specific legal rea.'ions for action. 
Raz hints at a second defense of the insulation of secondary reasons from primary 
reasons. He defends the insulation of authoritative reasons from straightforward substantive 
reasons against the charge that 'in every case authoritative directives can be overridden or 
disregarded if they deviate too much from the reasons which they are meant to reflect'32. If 
this is the case, it would be required from 'every person in every case to consider the merits of 
the case before he can decide to accept an authoritative instructionm. As he sees it, this 
objection is mistaken because it confuses clear mistakes with big ones, for, in order to 
10 iJem, 68-9. 
31 idem, 58. 
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establish if someone is dearly mistaken, there is no need for reasoning, and he concludes 
that. 
It is not the case that legitimate power of authorities is generally limited by the 
condition that it is defeated by significant mistakes which are not dear. 34 
Raz's concession that clear mistakes by the authority can allow first-order reasons to 
leak to the second-order level of reasoning is quickly followed by the warning that this does 
not imply that big mistakes have the same effect. Therefore, there is no need for reasoning 
thoroughly in order to find out if a mistake was great enough to put authority in check or 
not. But wouldn't the possibility that the authority makes big mistakes imply that we have 
the moral obligation of not stopping our investigation at the level of the prima facie moral 
intuition? Sometimes an action which does not seem remarkable prima facie turns out to 
be clearly wrong after reflection. If, in following authoritative rules, there is a possibility of 
making a big mistake, one of the obligations one might have is to try to clarify the situation. 
If, after reflection on the rights and wrongs of the case, no clear conclusion results, one 
might decide to follow the authoritative directive based on the fact, say, that the issuers of 
the rule seem to have a better idea of what is going on morally than the agent. But that 
would only happen after first-order practical reflection was carried out35• 
Finally, Raz offers an argument to the effect that 'the pre-emption thesis depends on a 
distinction between jurisdictional and other mistakes'36• Some mistakes by the authority, says 
Raz, are about factors that determine the limits of the authority's jurisdiction, others do not 
concern it. The former are never pre-empted, while the latter always are. Raz offers no reason 
why this distinction should be taken as morally relevant. In the absence of such justification, 
my argument against pre-emption stated above cannot be easily put aside. But, even if such 
justification could be provided, it would have to be grounded on a moral reason systemaricaHy 
prior to the first-order moral reasons. That would be the only way to explain how this moral 
reason wouldn't itself have to be weighed against first-order moral reasons. Here again the 
providing an answer to the problem of whether or not there could be systematic priority (or 
indexical order, as Rawls would put it) between moral reasons would help to make my point. 
I can't discuss the idea of moral systematic priority in here, but I don't believe that it is 
tenable37• If no systematic moral priority is justifiable, it follows that no justification that Raz 
could offer for the moral relevance of the dis6nction between jurisdictional and other mistakes 
would be able to exclude first-order reasons from an agent's practical decision-making process. 
32 idem, 61. 
-
13 ibidem. 
14 idem, 62. 
35 This paragraph's argument relies on the plausible assumption, stated in chapter one ~nd incorporated 
one w~y or ~nother in the arguments of the second, and third chapters, that reasoning makes it more 
likely that the agent would reach the morally correct conclusion. 
16 J. Raz, The Moraliry of Freedom, cit .• 62. 
J7 I take on that problem in the first chapter of my Ph D thesis Bcing appan from Reasons. (Edinburgh, 2000). 
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I believe I have provided by now sufficient evidence for my claim that Raz's attempt 
to justify the pre-emption of certain reasons fails on its own terms. But perhaps the problem 
is not so much the idea of pre-emption but Raz's particular conception of pre-emption. 
Perhaps what is needed is another formuJation of Raz's original insight that some reasons 
should be pre-empted from the deliberation process. Philip Soper tried to provide an 
alternative account of authoritative reasons' pre-emptive nature in which the idea of pre-
emption is taken one step further. But docs Soper's double pre-emption thesis succeed in 
justifying the insulation of first-order from second-order reasons? 
According to Soper, to say that the law is doubly pre-emptive means that it: 
typically intends to pre-empt (in the sense of rendering practically irrelevant) 
deliberations about both the content of the law and the legitimacy of the legal system.38 
According to the double pre-emption thesis39, an agent would not be treating a 
directive as authoritative if she performs her action because she has good reasons for treating 
the authoritative directive as legitimate. ln this case, even the second level of practical 
deliberation is closed to the agent and conclusions about the authority being illegitimate 
would make no difference to her following the authoritative directive. Notice that my objection 
to 1hz's conception of pre-emption does not apply to Soper's. My argument against Raz is 
simply that good first-order reasons imply a second-order reason that might be able to 
defeat the reasons one might have in favour of the pre-emption of that particular reason. If 
it is true that legal reasons do indeed pre-empt all second-order reasons concerning the 
legitimacy of legislative authority from the decision-making process, my attempt to bring 
first-order reasons back into the reasoning process fails. The probability calculation on which 
both Raz's art,:rument for pre-emption and my objection to it relied is not an issue here. 
However, the double pre-emption thesis is problematic for a number of other reasons, 
some of which are explicitly (even if not fully) discussed by Soper himself. 
Just after introducing the concept of double pre-emption as a feature of law's authority, 
Soper anticipates the objection that, were his conception of authority right, there would be 
"an insurmountable justification problem: if that is what people mean when they claim to 
w P. Soper, Legal theory and the claim of authority, cit., 216. 
3~ Soper's double pte-emption thesis is similar to B::mkowskl's thesis that under some conditions an agent 
should not 'think about it', as stated in, for instance, hi~ Don't think about it: legalism and legality in: L:l\V, 
Justice and the State ed. Karlsson et al Berlin: Dunker & Humblot, 1993, 53ff. Given the complexity and 
the wealth of arguments offered by Bankowski, engaging with them in here would take much longer 
than I can afford. 
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have authority, the claim could never be justified"40• The objection is not spelled out in its 
entirety by Soper. \X!hat lies at its bottom is the fact that, were authority to be understood in 
the way Soper proposes, there would be no room for deUberation by the agent subject to 
authority. Following an authoritative directive would mean not reflecting on the rights and 
wrongs of the situation, which means, denying one's own practical rationality. 
Soper's answer to this objection comprises, first, presenting the credentials of his 
claim by identifying it with a particular tradition of political theory (to which the likes of 
Hobbes belong) and, second, a theoretical move that pushes justification one step back, so 
that reason and autonomy are not entirely overridden by authority. In Soper's own terms: 
All that is required is that one shift the point of justification back one level: the 
problem now would be to offer sufficient reasons (as Hobbes tries to) for accepting an 
assertion that the subject is to deliberate neither about the merits of action nor about the 
merits of the claim of legitimacy. Reason in the end would still justify (because subjects 
could still deliberate, as Hobbes does, about the claim of double pre-emption); but it would 
be justification of a far more potent claim- a claim that action must be taken even though the 
action is wrong on its merits and even though the directing authority is wrong in its 
assumption about its own le&ritimacy. 41 
Soper's answer is related to his behef that legal and political philosophers often fail to 
distinguish between two rather different problems, to wit: the problem of the moral worth 
of poUtical institutions and the problem of someone's entitlement to be obeyed. Those are 
indeed different problems, but Soper believes something else, namely, that the answer to the 
problem of entitlement to obedience is independent from the answer to the problem of the 
moral worth of poUtjcal institutions. This thesis is not argued for in the article we've been 
discussing (apart from the reference to the tradition to which his thesis belongs). It is not 
immediately dear why his thesis should be right and, indeed, some troublesome consequences 
follow from it. 
The first problem that springs to mind is that reflection on the moral worth of 
political institutions (i.e. their 'legitimacy'), when entirely divorced from the question whether 
one should obey the illegitimate authority, seems to have very little practical importance. 
Which sort of action would be required of an agent who concludes that a given political 
arrangement is not legitimate? Perhaps, one might say, there follows an obligation to try to 
change the unjust political arrangements. But, if changing them is against the law, I shall not 
try to change them, for the considerations about legitimacy would be pre-empted from my 
particular decision-making process. And, indeed, given the fact that dictators and totalitarian 
governments have much more often safeguarded themselves through those sorts oflegal 
directives than democracies have, it would follow that, in those situations in which the 
w P. Soper, Legal theory and the claim of authority, cit., 216"217. 
41 idem, 217. 
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concept of legitimation is more badly needed, it would be toothless. Of course, one might 
say that a theory of entitlement to obedience wouldn't allow for totalitarian regimes to be 
entitled, but, if that were the case, it would follow that the moral qualities of the authorities 
would be likely to have some relevance in deciding whether one should obey someone's 
directives and that is not permitted by the double pre-emption thesis. 
Soper's claim that a justification could be provided for always obeying the law 
regardless of the correctness of the action required and of the legitimacy of the authority 
could be defended against this charge if it takes a slightly different form. It could be said that 
the justification is independent of the quality of the action and of the legitimacy of the 
authority, although, in some particular instances of its appllcation, this reason could be 
defeated by reasons for not acting in the way required by law. That thesis was indeed defended 
by Soper himself in an earlier artide42. Regardless of his success in providing such justification, 
it should be dear enough that this sort of justification does not pre-empt first-order reasons, 
since those reasons applied in a concrete case could, in his own terms, defeat the obligation 
to obey the law. 
And that brings me to a second and more conclusive objection. If a justification for 
acting only on legal reasons is provided, it is either the case that this justification is grounded 
in a value which is absolute, or it is the case that the value on which the justification for 
obedience is grounded could be challenged by another value. If the latter is the case, in any 
situation in which the most important value would be at stake, it should have prevalence 
and any first-order consideration embodying such a value would have to prevail. If the 
former is the case, it is still possible that, in an instant case, the va!ue that grounds absolute 
obedience is better served by disobeying the legal rule, in which case a reason for action 
conveying this value would have to defeat the justification. 
Soper's reformulation of the pre-emption thesis does not incorporate the element 
that makes Raz's normal justification thesis so difficult to object to: Raz's ground for pre-
emption, the normal justification thesis, is self~evident. No moral value could possibly 
conflict with the thesis according to which one has to decide to do what would probably be 
d1e right action all things considered, unless one wants to deny the ethical enterprise altogether. 
Unless Soper offers a justification which is not moral but analytical within ethics, his 
justification for obeying the law without considering any other reason as practically relevant 
would always be vulnerable to arguments from moral value (either from superior moral 
value or for a better app]jcation of the same value that grounds obedience to law). 
42 P. Soper, The obligation to obey the law, in Issues in Contemporary Legal Philosophy ed. R. Gavison, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989, 127,155, In this article, Soper offers reasons for a prima facie obligation 
to obey the law which could be defeated by other obligations of superior weight (esp. 151-2). Nothing 
was said about an absolute obligation to obey the law. 
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Soper's double pre-emption thesis is in some respects similar to Bankowski's thesis 
that under some conditions an agent should not 'think about it'. However, there is a 
difference between the two insights and I believe that that difference makes it possible that 
Bankowski's advice that one should not 'think about it' be correct even if the double pre-
emption thesis is wrong. Before I move on to present what I consider to be the best way to 
conceive of fonnal reasons, let me briefly explain the implications of the arguments presented 
so far in this chapter to Bankowski's thesis that there are times in which decision makers 
should think about it and times in which they should not think about it. The point of 
having rules, Bankowski believes, is partly to provide causes for behaviour, rather than 
reasons. Rules are partly analogous to physical obstacles we might find when taking a walk. 
Those obstacles not so much provide us vrith a reason to walk around them as they effectively 
cause us to do it43 • Rules work at their best when they transcend prescription and become 
mere descriptions of states of affairs, as Bankowski showed in hjs analysis of automated 
systems. We have rules 'so that things get more predictable'44 • But there is something even 
more strikingly valuable in letting rules cause us to react in certain ways. Rule-foUowing is 
also constitutive of morality: although it is not the whole of morality, Bankowski argues that 
it is a condition for its possibility Differently from machines, however, we have an ability to 
respond to situations that is not simply an ability to react45 . This ability to respond is what 
explains that we might recognise situations in which letting the rules rule our behaviour is 
not appropriate. As Bankowski puts it 
humans have this facility ... of not only reacting but of correcting~ and on this 
analogy we might think of that as jumping beyond, learning virtue and thus being able to be 
virtuous in other drcumstances.46 
But in order to learn this responsive skill, one must engage in the machine-like 
activity of rule-following47• That is the sense in which rule-following (i.e. being causally 
affected by rules) is constitutive of morality. Now, is any of this inconsistent with my view 
on pre~emptive reasons? That will depend on the scope of Bankowski's daim. 
If what Bankowski means is that there ate situations in which one should not think 
at all, and situations in which thinking is reguired, in which case the 'it' in the phrase 'think 
43 Z. Bankowski Living Lawfully, outprint, 128. The outprint in my possession is the camera,reaJy copy 
of Bankowski's new book to be published by Kluwer Academic Publishers. For that reason, the page 
references also apply t"O his forthcoming book. 
44 Z. Bankowski, Living Lawfully, cit., 127. 
45 idem, 131-2 . 
• !(, idem, 132. 
" ibidem. 
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about it' would mean the same as 'what is the right thing to do', me and Bankowski do not 
disagree. Indeed I believe that there is an argument to ground the thesis that reasoning is not 
always the morally best decision-making process, and that means that, in some situations, 
one should not 'think about it'. Elsewhere48, I tried to offer grounds to the claim that a 
morally good person might be required to let certain facts cause her to perform certain 
actions, and that would, as far as I can see, help to prove Bankowski's point. I haven't dealt 
with the problem of whether or not rules can be conceived as causes, but I see no reason to 
disagree with Bankowski's conclusions on this respect Indeed, I believe that conceiving rules 
as causes is one of Bankowski's most important insights, an insight that actually goes 
against the majority views on the nature of rules, that tend to conceive them as reasons to 
decide to perform an action. 
Bankowski believes that the way of life of the law-abiding man requires that he 
sometimes does not think matters substantively and one of the advantages of doing that is 
that the law-abiding man's obedience ends up producing the ability of creatively breaking the 
law (which is part of what being law-abiding is about). However, even on this interpretation 
of what Bankowski means by 'thinking about it' there may still be some room for 
disagreement, for I believe that public agents should only act on reasons (were the empirical 
conditions for reasoning, such as enough time and resources, to obtain), while Bankowski, 
on the other hand, makes no qualifications and seems at times to think that the 
recommendation of not thinking about it crossed the boundaries between public and 
private agency. If this is so, we do indeed disagree at least partially. 
There is, however, a second interpretation of the phrase 'don't think about it'. In 
this second interpretation, the 'it' in the phrase refers to a formal rule that is applicable to the 
case at hand and the advice not to think about it means that one should not think about the 
reasons behind the formal reason. In that interpretation, it is not reasoning that is not 
recommended, but substantive reasoning. This seems indeed to be the interpretation 
favoured by Bankowski when he writes that 'We treat the !formall reason as conclusive 
because it is there, we do not need to inquire behind it and 'think about it'49• I wish to 
express no view on whether or not this sort of exclusion can be morally justified for private 
•g The grounds for this belief is presented iJ1 the first chapter of my Ph D thesis (sec note 37). 
4
'; Z. Bankowski, Don't t·hink about it: legalism and legality, cit., 53. 
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decision-making, but elsewhere I argued that public agents must always think about it50• 
What my argument against Raz and Soper tried to prove is simply that they offer no good 
reason for public agents not to reason substantively all the time. But if those arguments 
fail, how can we conceive of formal reasons? That is the question I consider in the next 
section. 
Formal Reasons 
Raz is not the only legal theorist to identify the formality of a legal reason for action 
with its capacity to exclude other reasons. More importantJy, his argument grounded on the 
normal justification thesis is not the only argument put forward to justify that conception 
of law's formalJty. Indeed, there are arguments which seem to render the exclusionary 
conception of the formality of law plausible, without making use of the idea of secondary 
reasons. I shall now move on to investigate whether or not, and in which sense, those 
arguments are able to justify the exclusion of reasons from decision-making processes. In 
what follows, I shall use Atiyah's Form and Substance in Legal Reasoning as a paradigmatic 
presentation of this sort of argument. However, before I deal with the arguments themselves, 
let me first ask what exactly is the claim that those arguments are supposed to ground. 
The claim, as Atiyah puts it, is that, whenever formal reasons are in play, 'ft]here is no 
question of weighing one set of factors against another'51 for 'ft]he formal reason ... simply 
excludes from consideration any countervailing reason'52• If the formal reason is good, 'all 
other argument is irrelevant'53 • Again, what seems to be at stake is an exclusion by kind of 
some sorts of reasons by the formal reason. But the claim is often qualified. This exclusion 
only happens, 'within certain limits'54 • As Atiyah puts it: 
If a statute seems ambiguous, or unclear, or if it produces results which seem 
grossly anomalous or utterly absurd or perhaps even seriously unjust, then courts may avoid 
applying the statute. 55 
Indeed, one of the differences between using formal reasons and being a formalist, 
according to Ariyah, is openness to the possibility of introducing exceptions to the application 
of rules. Those qualifications show a certain uneasiness with the conception of legal formality 
that equates it with the exclusion of certain sorts of reasons from judicial decision-making, 
an uneasiness that is paradigmatically shown in a passage of Frederick Schauer's Playing by 
the Rules in which he proposes that exclusionary reasons could be conceived as telling an 
agent to look just quickly, if possible, at the excluded first-order reason to see if this is one 
of the cases in which the exclusion of that factor should be disregarded, ... 56 
'
0 Again thar problem was subject to scrutiny in my Ph D thesis, mentioned above, note 37. 
51 P. S. Atiyah, Form :1nd substance in comract law, cit., 20. 
>z idem, 21. 
·
1
' ibidem. 
14 idem, 22. 
'' ibidem. Similarly for precedents at 23. 
56 F. Schauer, Playing by the Rules, cit., 91. 
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Now, as Emilios Christodoulidis has already pointed out, it is not at all clear how the 
thesis that formal reasons always exclude other reasons for action could be made compatible 
with the qualification that sometimes some sorts of reasons (e.g. gross injustice) can defeat 
the formal reason57• This teads to an ambiguity in the conception of formal reasons that is 
clearly expressed in Atiyah's (apparent) paradox that an exclusionary reason 'operates rather 
like a presumption which is sometimes irrebuttable, but sometimes rebuttable'58. The question 
that must be asked is which sorts of reasons can be put forward in order for the judge (or 
anyone subject to the law, for that matter) to consider the formal reason in a particular case to 
be irrebuttable. 
Atiyah presents some reasons that he believes would justify the exclusionary 
conception of legal reasons. One of those reasons concerns the low cost~effectiveness of 
comprehensive reasoningw. This argument by no means exhausts the list of arguments dut 
aim at justifying the exclusion of some reasons from the process of decision-making and, to 
be sure, Atiyah himself offers other such arguments60 • However, the argument of cost-
effectiveness is a paradigm of the sort of argument for exclusion that does not rely on 
second-order reasons and that makes it suitable to be used as a means to show why arguments 
of its kind cannot justify the exclusion of reasons from decision-making processes. 
According to the argument of cost-effectiveness, a full investigation on all the relevant 
reasons for action in any particuJar case would be way too cosdy. That cost makes it prohibitive 
that the public agent effectively uses all reasons that might be in principle applicable to the 
case. The problem of cost becomes even more serious given the obligation that public 
agents have of being impartial regarding those who are subject to their authority, for if a 
judge is to grant a costly investigation to one subject, he would have to do the same to all 
other subjects in the same situation. However, we must here differentiate between, on the 
one hand, reasons which are applicable to the case but which are defeated by other reasons 
also applicable to the case and, on the other hand, the reasons that are simply not applicable 
to the case. Before I consider whether or not the argument of cost-effectiveness has any 
bearing on situations in which applicable reasons are weighed agajnst one another, let me 
deal with the problem of the applicability of a reason. A reason might be proved not to 
apply to the case when the facts do not allow it. The fact that murder was committed is a 
good reason to sentence the accused to life in prison only if the accused was the one who 
committed the murder and whether or not this is the case is a matter of investigating/acts. 
Factual investigation might be indeed very costly and the argument of cost-effectiveness 
seems to justify that certain factual investigations not be performed comprehensively. 
57 E. Christodou!idis The irrationality of merciful legal judgement: exclusionary reasoning and the 
question of the particular. Law and Philosophy, 18 (1999), at 231. 
5 ~ P. S. Atiyah, Form and substance in contract law,cit., 37. 
59 idem, 24ff. 
60 For an overview of the arguments for the formality of law, see N. MacCormick, The ethics of legalism, 
Ratio Iuris, 2, 184-193. 
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But can the argument for cost~effecriveness justify that formal reasons exclude other 
reasons that arc available to the agent? The argument would only work in those situations 
if a further argument is provided that proves that weighing already available substantive 
reasons against each other is significantly more costly than weighing formal reasons agaimt 
each other. 
More interestingly for my purposes here, there is no systematic priority between the 
need to be cost-effective and moral reasons. Cost-effectiveness in judicial decisions might be 
granted some moral value if it is backed by good mmal reasons for society to have a legal 
system at all, such as the value of co-ordination of behaviour or more generally the value of 
security in human affairs. But those reasons are reasons to be weighed against other moral 
reasons. Tllls is the sense in wh1ch the argument of cost-effectiveness is paradigmatic of the 
sorts of arguments offered by Atiyah and others for the formal nature of legal rules. 
Differently from Raz's normal justification thesis, those arguments are ultimately grounded 
in first-order moral reasons and, for that reason, they cannot claim systematic priority; and 
because they cannot claim systematic priority, they cannot justify the systematic exclusion of 
other moral values, which might themselves defeat them. The 'formality' of law is a result 
of a number of good reasons not to reason comprehensively, but those reasons arc themselves 
first-order moral reasons and their nature makes it conceivable that they be sometimes 
defeated by other moral reasons. 
That reading of the formality of law explains why formal reasons operate 'within 
constraints', that is to say, it explains why there are cases whose solution according to formal 
reasons is so 'grossly anomalous or utterly absurd or perhaps even seriously unjust' that 
substantive reasons break through the formality of law in order to influence the decision. In 
otber words, it helps to explain the sense in the apparent paradox that formal reasons are 
'sometimes irrebuttable, but sometimes rebuttable'. 
Now, is there a reason why one should stick to the exclusionary conception of formal 
reasons instead of adopting a conception of formal reasons as reasons that are grounded on 
very important first-order reasons such as, promoting social stability, preventing public 
agents to decide arbitrarily, or improving co-ordination between the members of society? 
Christodoulidis presented some reasons why law's formality can only be conceived in an 
exclusionary fashion. He claims that law is an evolutionary achievement that diminishes 
social complexity and that accepting that first-order reasons leak into the second-order level 
of justification would 'undo law as an institutional achievcment'61 • But why would this 
undoing be problematic? The problem seems to be the fact that without an exclusionary 
conception of formality, social complexity would once again increase. There is no denying 
61 li. Christodoulidis, The irrationality of merciful legal judgement,cit., 235. 
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that social complexity will indeed increase. However, there is no reason to believe that a 
certain level of social disintegration would not be a price worth paying for more goodness in 
public decision-making. To be sure, if the social disintegration caused by changing our 
concept oflegal formality would be so great as to make social interaction impossible (under 
conditions of double contingency) that would be a very good reason indeed to stick to our 
evolutionary achievement of conceiving formality in an exclusionary way. But l see no reason 
why the very important first-order reasons mentioned above as good grounds for deciding 
according to the law wouldn't be able to guarantee a very high level of social integration. This 
would leave the space open to other first-order reasons to enter judicial decision-making, as 
well as the decision-making of law-abiding citizens in general, for the strong first-order 
reasons they have to stick to the law are, as is any first-order reason, defeasible. 
In this conception of formality, formal and substantive reasons arc entangled, the 
formality of formal reasons being guaranteed by strong substantive reasons. That conception 
of fomulity is, therefore, highly sensitive to substantive arguments, and that is, perhaps, the 
next evolutionary achievement of social systems. Indeed, various instances of changes in 
legal practice bear witness to the increased importance of substantive argument in judicial 
decision-making. The most striking example is perhaps the growth of the concept of good 
faith in German case law, notably in the first quarter of the 20th century62 • The judicial use of 
the concept has defied all attempts to circumscribe 'good faith' to a strict definition or to 
reduce it to a numerus clausus list of rules. Good faith seems to be simply a door through 
which weighty substantive considerations came to be used as grounds for the decision of 
German courts. Contemporary substantive considerations are as much included in 'good 
faith' as substantive considerations inspired in roman and romanistic lav./>3. It has recently 
been defined as a requirement of fairness in private affairs and, in this conception, good faith 
is clearly a window within the legal system for considerations of substance in judicial decision-
making. 
Having pointed out the differences between Christodoulidis's approach to formality 
and mine, let me just briefly show where they coincide. Both Christodoulidis and I share a 
preoccupation with the colonization of the ethical by the legal, of the substantive by the 
formaL His way out of this colonization is his understanding of the concept of mercy as a 
"" On the evolution of the concept of good faith, see). hhrtins--Costa A Boa-fe no Direito Privado:sistema 
e tOpica no proccsso obrigacional (Siio Paulo: Ed. Revista dos Tribunais, 1999). 
t•J As, e.g., the clause forbidding the venire contra factum proprium. For other sorts of substantive 
considerations that made 1heir way into German legal decisions through the concept of good faith, see 
F. Wicacker El Principio General de Ia Buena fc (Madrid: Civitas, 1976; J L de los Mozos, trans). 
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doorway into a more complex world where reflexivity (roughly what I call plenary reasoning) 
has its space. I'vfine is to redefine formality so that reflexivity becomes inherent to formal (and 
amongst them legal) reasons, in a way that actually resembles the old positivist call not to act 
on legal norms without having good moral reasons backing your action. 
Conclusion 
I expect to have proven in this paper that the sort of strategy proposed by Raz (and 
partially adopted by Soper) in order to insulate authoritative from substantive reasons does 
not succeed. That means that neither Raz's justification for pre-emption nor Soper's offer a 
good reason for public agents not to reason substantively all the time. 
It would seem that destroying such strategies renders formal reasons useless in 
practical decision-making that aims at being morally correct. I believe that is correct. Yet, what 
would follow from that? Only that a new conception of formal reasons needs to be built in 
which formal reasons are not in opposition to substantive reasons, but are somehow 
derived from actual substantive reasons. 
